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A major concern for disaster relief today is the inefficiency of disaster relief 
efforts by disaster relief organizations (DROs). DROs, as non-profit organizations, rely 
considerably on donations. Donor-intent often leaves many DROs without the option of 
optimally allocating and utilizing these donations. Because donor intentions lean more 
towards immediate disaster relief rather than long term interests such as disaster 
prediction, prevention, and preparation, there tends to be a surplus of ex post investment 
and a shortage of ex ante investments for disaster relief. After identifying the economic 
reasons for a shortage of ex ante donor investment, this paper focuses on how to increase 
donations to ex ante efforts of DROs, arguing that increasing ex ante investment will help 
correct the inefficiency of ex post efforts. It concludes that DROs can take either a budget 




Disasters tend to cause a lot of chaos; they wouldn’t be considered so “disastrous” 
if they didn’t. Thus, disaster relief often tends to be chaotic. In fact, chaos is commonly 
associated with disaster. But what if it were possible to reduce the chaos of a disaster and 
making such an event less "disastrous" for victims and aid workers? This paper shows 
that if more resources were allocated to predicting, preventing, and preparing for disasters 
among disaster relief organizations, post-disaster relief efforts would be less chaotic, and 
more efficient. Because characteristics of chaos such as disorganization lead to higher 




There are many reasons for the chaos after a disaster. The underlying reason for 
the inefficiency is the urgent nature of a disaster. The urgent nature puts a time constraint 
on disaster relief leading to two main inefficiencies. First, there is poor disaster 
management by DROs. Under a time constraint, DROs must quickly assess needs and 
allocate resources accordingly. Time is more valuable in times of disaster so the cost of 
time begins to outweigh efficiency, and DROs may waste other resources in order to save 
time. Second, because of the urgent nature of disasters, DROs may not be able to spend 
the time to prepare for disaster relief, which is why preparation should be done ahead of 
time in what we call ex ante disaster relief efforts. 
The ex ante side of disaster relief is the investment in relief before a disaster 
occurs. This comes in the forms of disaster prevention, prediction, and preparation. 
Resources go into researching the ability to predict a disaster before it happens so that it 
can either be prevented or prepared for. A greater portion of resources go into preparation 
for a disaster. This can be anything from building a better infrastructure more able to 
handle a disaster, to insuring those with high-risk, to training disaster relief staff and 
volunteers. 
In contrast to ex ante efforts, ex post efforts can be described as the actual disaster 
relief efforts made after the disaster has occurred. Ex post can be in the short-term and 
long-term. Short-term ex post efforts can include but is not limited to the rescue of 
disaster victims, immediate healthcare for ill or injured, food and shelter rebuilding of 
basic infrastructure; while long-term ex post efforts often include lifetime counseling for 
traumatized survivors, and foundations for victims and their families. DROs do not 




the remaining funds leftover after immediate disaster relief, because there often tends to 
be more money donated to disaster relief than needed. While a DRO may prefer to 
allocate this leftover money towards ex ante research and preparation finding it a more 
worthwhile investment in the longrun1, donor-intent often restricts them to using funds 
for a specific cause or victims of a particular disaster. Thus, DROs often have to create 
foundations or scholarships and other long-term investments for victims and their 
families, rather than putting the funds where they find most beneficial and efficient. 
So part of the inefficiency of disaster relief efforts is because of the shortage or 
undersupply of ex ante efforts as a result of donor preference in ex post aid. An increase 
in ex ante efforts would improve the efficiency of ex post disaster relief efforts in general. 
The reasoning behind this is that if more efforts are put into predicting, preparing, and 
preventing disasters, when a disaster actually comes DROs would be more prepared, 
making ex post disaster relief more efficient. If ex post relief was more efficient, then less 
resources would be needed to be devoted to it. In other words, if we were able to predict, 
prepare for, and prevent disasters, then we could reduce the cost of time as well as 
transaction costs of post disaster relief, making it more efficient. These costs would 
decrease with preparation because disaster relief efforts would be more organized.  
In summary, the time constraint inherent to disaster relief is a main cause of the 
inefficiency, however the lack of ex ante investment does not help to relieve this 
constraint at all. Increased investment in ex ante efforts could relieve some of this time 
constraint; however donor-intent tends to lean away from ex ante investment towards ex 
                                               
1
 Robert A. Katz argues that money spent on long-term disaster relief is wasteful because of the 
diminishing marginal utility, suggesting that it is a better allocation of resources to satisfy the short-term 





post, preventing DROs from being able to put some of their donated revenues towards ex 
ante investment to make ex post efforts more efficient under such a time constraint 
inherent to disaster relief. If DROs were not restricted by donor-intent and could invest 
more in ex ante efforts, they could be more prepared for disasters and thus increase 
efficiency of ex post relief efforts. 
This paper has been written to bring light on ways to increase this ex ante 
investment from individual donors, so that ex post disaster relief efforts can be more 
efficient and less chaotic. Because donors invest through private donations, we are 
focusing on ways to increase private donations towards ex ante efforts. After identifying 
the economic reasons behind why donors prefer to invest in ex post efforts, we will be 
equipped to address how to increase ex ante investment.  
 
II. Literature Review 
The chaos of 9-11 and Hurricane Katrina relief efforts, initiated a great deal of 
discussion on the inefficiency of disaster relief efforts. Early literature simply pointed out 
that these disaster relief efforts were inefficient, while later literature began to ask why. It 
appears to be a general consensus among scholars that lack of preparedness for a disaster 
is the underlying source of inefficient relief efforts. More recently, empirical studies 
show that greater ex ante investment is in fact beneficial to ex post disaster relief.  
Literary response to this realization began with a discussion on the inefficiencies 
in 9-11 and Hurricane Katrina relief efforts. Critique of such disaster relief ranged from 
the organizations to individuals to the government. A staff report from the U.S. House of 




Oversight of the Committee on Homeland Security (2006) reflects on many of the 
failures of Federal assistance to New York after the 9/11 disaster. It discusses the failures 
and flaws in the managements system regarding waste, fraud, and abuse of disaster 
assistance, claiming the urgent-nature of disasters as a primary source for this abuse. 
They find that the expediting of relief delivery led to many oversights and systematic 
problems.2 The government focused more on the charitable DRO side at the House Ways 
and Means Oversight Committee hearing on December 13, 2005 (Independent Sector, 
2005). Again, the focus here was on fraud, showing that the government concerns are not 
unique to Federal agencies, but apply to non-profit DROs as well.  The House Ways and 
Means Oversight Committee also expressed concern with the inefficiency that the lack of 
coordination among DROs causes in their hearing. 
Later research shows that developed countries have a better response to disasters 
because they have had the capability to invest more in ex ante preparation for disasters 
(Mahul & Gurenko, 2006) providing evidence for the relationship between ex ante and ex 
post investment. Furthermore, the Panel on the Nonprofit Sector has recommended 
providing incentives to increase support of ongoing services and the sustainability of 
DROs, reflecting the emphasis on ex ante disaster research and preparation (Independent 
Sector, 2005).3 The Panel asks Congress to provide incentives that would cause increased 
public ex ante investment. 
It is because of such a push that the non-profit sector has made significant strides 
already towards increasing ex ante investment. There has already been a structural 
                                               
2
 The Subcommittee alleges that five systematic problems emerge due to the expediting of relief delivery – 
lack of information sharing and cooperation, inadequate verification prior to disbursing funds, duplicative 
payments, relaxed or ineffective controls, and weak oversight of procurement (p. 11). 
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response to this need for greater ex ante investment. Neil R. Britton (1991) noted the 
emergence of permanent disaster volunteers, an idea originating with Stoddard in 1969. 
However, although DROs are internally experiencing movement towards increased ex 
ante investment, research has yet to show an overall movement of donor intent from ex 
post to ex ante, despite the Nonprofit Sector Panel’s attempt to get Congress to provide 
more donor incentives. 
Perhaps once the sector better understands why donors prefer ex post investment 
to ex ante they would be better able to target incentives that could help move donor-intent 
more in their favor. Only recently has literature begun to emerge about the reasons for 
donor preference in ex post investment. In general, literature cites the reason for a 
shortage of donor investment in ex ante as too low of perceived benefits of ex ante 
investment on the part of donors. Reasons for this are related to the positive externalities 
of ex ante investment, the today’s generation’s high discount rates of the future, a 
substantial difference between an individual’s perceived risk of disaster and their actual 
risk of disaster, as well as a lack of incentive for ex ante investment, and a budget 
constraint for the poor in particular. 
 
A Positive Externality 
A reason cited for lack of ex ante investment by the government, which can be 
adapted to individual donors in society, is that of positive horizontal political externalities 
(Depoorter, 2007). This means that when one government actor invests in ex ante efforts, 
other government actors benefit as well. However, no one takes into consideration these 




on others of their investment or the benefit on themselves of others’ investments. It is a 
called a horizontal externality because it benefits other government actors who are on the 
same level as them. The reasoning behind this externality is that citizens tend to see the 
government as a single entity working together and sharing responsibility amongst its 
parts. When one government actor invests in ex ante efforts, the demand placed upon 
other actors to invest decrease because everyone shares the responsibility. People are 
more concerned with the total investment on the part of the government rather than how 
much each actor invests. 
 
A Misperception of Disaster Probability and Risk 
Related to these ideas on insurance, but also more directly relating to ex ante 
donations, are studies on the disparity between actual risk of disaster and perceived risk 
as a result of imperfect information (Kenreuther et al, 2004). Such studies suggest that 
people see themselves as zero or little risk when in fact they have quite a significant risk. 
Kenreuther et al says this misperception can be due to imperfect information, the inability 
to interpret information accurately, or the use of a threshold model when making 
decisions. It is said that the expected benefits of knowing the information is too high 
relative to the costs of getting the information for some people leading them to not gather 
the information (Kenreuther & Pauly, 2006). So sometimes people simply are not aware 
of their risk at all, while other times they have been given an inaccurate estimate of their 
risk. Still, there are times when accurate information on the probability or likelihood of 
disaster is available, but they do not know whether that statistic implies a high risk or low 




model in which they compare their probability of disaster to a threshold probability; and 
if their probability is smaller than the threshold, they would tend to assume a zero 
probability altogether (Kenreuther et al). 
 
A High Future Discount Rate 
Furthermore, there has been discussion of discount rates of the future being too 
high for many of today’s generations. Especially among politicians, but for any 
individual or group donor in general it appears too high. Scholars argue that discount 
rates of the future are especially high for politicians because their motives are political 
and related to elections. The discount rates for anything beyond re-election or their term 
of office is extremely high. 
In regards to individuals, today’s instant gratification society has the tendency to 
consume now rather than investment in anything long-term reflecting high future 
discount rates. Kenreuther et al (2004) points out these high discount rates of the future 
from looking at several studies on the lack of investment in energy-saving equipment. 
This need for instant gratification in today’s society is further shown by people’s 
increasing consumerism (Bauman 1998). 
 
A Moral Hazard: Lack of Incentive 
There is also a lack of incentive for people to invest in ex ante providing a moral 
hazard. Particularly for politicians whose term is ending and cannot be re-elected, there is 
little incentive to follow through with any promises for ex ante investment because there 




accountability among sectors of the government also provides a lack of incentive for an 
individual government actor to invest (Depoorter, 2007). 
Similarly, for individual donations to ex ante disaster preparation efforts, the easy 
access and likelihood of ex post relief encourages free-riding, or the opportunity for 
people to receive ex post benefits without making ex ante investments. (Mahul & 
Gurenko, 2006, Kunreuther & Pauly, 2006). Scholars see this act of “haphazard public 
disaster relief” as a moral hazard for such organizations. 
 
A Budget Constraint 
Like donations, insurance is a type of ex ante investment. There is much study on 
insurance as a disaster preparation mechanism. Investment in insurance before a disaster 
provides for better relief after the disaster. Accordingly, theories on disaster insurance 
can be adapted to ex ante donations for disaster relief. Such studies show that budget 
limitations are a primary reason for less ex ante investment. Studies also show that 
underdeveloped insurance markets are a cause for lower investment in insurance for the 
poor in developing countries (Mahul & Gurenko, 2006), while in wealthier countries the 
poor are more likely not to invest in insurance because costs relative to benefits are too 
high when subject to tight budget constraints (Kenreuther & Pauly, 2006, Smith et al, 
2006). And even if the benefits were higher as is the case for someone living in a high 
risk location, there are still those living “pay day to pay day” who cannot afford such 
expenses (Kenreuther & Pauly). In response to this, Mahul and Gurenko present a risk-




countries. On the other hand, in wealthier countries it has been suggested to require or 
subsidize insurance to increase investment (Kenreuther & Pauly).  
 
III. Economic Analysis 
Currently DROs are operating in the inefficient state in which ex ante disaster 
relief investment is undersupplied. To reiterate, our understanding that ex ante investment 
is undersupplied comes from the idea that ex post disaster relief are inefficient partially 
due to the lack of preparation. If ex ante investment was to increase, DROs would be 
more prepared and ex post efforts would be more efficient. Thus, there exists an ex ante 
demand greater than is supplied.  
Realizing now that increasing ex ante disaster relief investment will benefit ex 
post disaster relief effort, how do we get people to increase their investment in or 
donations to DROs’ ex ante efforts?  There are many studies on how budget constraints 
limit donations (Kenreuther et al, 2004, Kenreuther & Pauly, 2006, Mahul & Gurenko, 
2006), but this paper also looks at how changing one’s utility curves through tastes and 
preference could favor more ex ante investment as well. So far we have looked into 
reasons why there is not more investment in ex ante efforts. We have seen that positive 
externalities, higher than normal discount rates on the future and lower perceived risk 
rates, as well as budget limitations and a moral hazard problem push ex ante investment 







An expected utility maximization model 
Looking at a basic expected utility maximizing model, we see that the person 
would donate DA and have disposable income YA at the price of donations equal to PD and 
the price of disposable income equal to PY. In this model, the person is able to maximize 
their utility at the point where the budget constraint is tangent to the indifference curve. 
Recall from basic economics that at this point, the price of donating relative to the price 
of disposable income (PD/PY) equals the marginal rate of substitution of Y for D 
(MRSY,D). 
 
A Utility and Benefit Approach 
Individuals are misperceiving the benefits of ex ante investment as too low 
because of positive externalities. Similar to the positive horizontal political externality 
within government ex ante investment, there is a positive externality of individual donor 
investments in ex ante efforts as well. Just as with different government actors, when one 
individual invests in ex ante efforts, a portion of the aggregate demand has been met, and 
so the demand on individuals is somewhat alleviated. 
Additionally, there is an external benefit of one’s investment in ex ante disaster 
relief efforts on the greater community. Because disasters are usually massive, more ex 
ante investment could save their neighbor, friend, or even save their entire hometown 
community from entering the ruins forever. If people recognize these externalities and 
realize how much ex ante investment benefits everyone, not just themselves, they will 
consider this as a factor when deciding how much to donate. When people begin to 




greater than their private benefits alone, their tastes and preferences may change in 
accordance and they may donate more. 
A realization of the external benefits is reflected in the expected utility model as a 
flatter indifference curve as well as an up and leftward shift in the indifference curve. 
Similar to how a fad would affect ones indifference curve, a realization of external 
benefits has this affect as well. Because the marginal benefit of donations has increased 
relative to the marginal benefit of disposable income, donations are relatively more 
valuable, and so the MRSY,D should decrease. The up and leftward shift in the curve 
represents the increased preference for donations in relation to disposable income. 
Likewise, perfect risk assessment and decreased discount rates would affect one’s 
perceived marginal benefit of donations relative to marginal benefit of disposable income. 
Assuming perceived risk is lower than actual risk in most cases, increasing risk 
perception to a level comparable to actual risk would increase one’s perceived private 
benefit of investment in ex ante efforts. Decreasing discount rates for the future would 
further increase individuals’ perceived benefits of ex ante investment, because it would 
increase their expected returns in the future. This would make ex ante investment now 
more valuable relative to disposable income. Just as positive externalities affected 
expected utility, increased risk perception and decreased discount rates would have a 
similar change in the expected utility curve as they both increase individuals’ perceived 
benefits of ex ante investment. Therefore, a change in any or all of these variables would 
affect the person’s expected total benefits as described and accordingly their utility curve, 








While this diagram is intended to illustrate how a change in the expected utility 
could potentially increase ex ante investment from IA to IB, point B could also illustrate 
the efficient allocation of income. In this case, the dashed IC1 curve would represent a 
person’s actual utility and benefits at any given level of ex ante disaster relief investment, 
while the original solid curve would represent their current expected utility and benefits 
based on the their imperfect risk information and high discount rates. The difference 
between points A and B in this diagram shows graphically how ex ante investment is 
undersupplied while disposable income is oversupplied when individuals’ expected 
utility curves are not comparable to their actual utility curves. The ideal affect on 
expected utility would be for the person’s expected utility curve to become equal to their 




case that it moves even farther, there would become a surplus of ex ante investment, 
which would be equally inefficient. 
 
A Budget and Cost Approach 
 Another approach DROs could take to increase ex ante donations would be to 
alter the budget constraint curve for donors by manipulating the relative marginal cost or 
price of donating. This could be done several ways. The first way is to increase the cost 
of not donating, while the second way would be to decrease the cost of donating. 
 The lack of incentive and accountability provides a moral hazard problem. The 
cost of not donating is too low because individuals only suffer from external costs. They 
do not suffer from private costs because they end up receiving free public disaster relief 
in the aftermath of the disaster whether they invested in ex ante programs or not. 
Establishing an incentive program or holding individuals accountable would increase the 
costs of not donating. If individuals realized that they would suffer consequences for 
donating less than the efficient level of ex ante donations, this would be an incentive for 
them to donate more. 
Income tax deductions can be seen as a type of incentive to donate. However, 
income tax deductions decrease the cost of donating rather than increase the cost of not 
donating. An income tax deduction has two main affects on the quantity of donations. 
Tax deductions decrease the cost of donating through the price effect, which can be 
decomposed into a substitution effect and an income effect. Both the substitution and 




the reasoning behind the substitution effect, while an increase in real income as a result of 
the fall in price explains the income effect part of the price effect. 
On the other hand, although income tax deductions decrease the price of 
donations through the price effect, income taxes in general decrease one’s income 
through the tax income effect. This effect is counteractive to the price effect, however, 
historically it has a relatively small effect on overall ex ante investment in comparison to 
the price effect. Figure 2 below illustrates the increase in ex ante investment that can 




IV. Discussion and Conclusion 
In conclusion, DROs can take two approaches towards increasing donations to 




returns approach. While the earlier may be easier to accomplish with quicker results, it 
bears many ethical issues that make the latter approach seem more appealing.  
To change the budget line is something the government and DROs can do directly 
by either discriminating post-disaster relief efforts or changing tax policies. Not 
providing post-disaster relief to those who have not made pre-disaster investments would 
create an incentive and fix the moral hazard problem. In economic terms, this would 
increase the cost of not investing, which can be interpreted as a relative decrease in the 
price of investing as well. The other option DROs could petition the government for 
would be to increase tax-deductions on ex ante donations at the least or decrease income 
tax in general. Either of these tax options would cause the relative price in donating to ex 
ante efforts to decrease as well.  
Several problems arise with each of these cost-altering approaches however. 
Ethical issues clearly arise with the discrimination against those who did not invest in 
disaster relief prior to the event at such a life-threatening and crucial time as the 
immediate aftermath of a disaster. In addition, compiling detailed information on who has 
donated or invested in ex ante and how much they have donated is difficult and 
inefficient in a time of emergency. Although this is essentially what insurance companies 
do, insurance companies are a for-profit institution. Whether an individual took 
precautionary measures, people generally would agree that they still have the right to life 
and safety. Rather, the debate is over whose responsibility it is to ensure that everyone 
gets this right. 
 Tax rates, on the other hand, are always under debate in Congress, showing that it 




These debates go for tax-deductions as well. There is an opportunity for tax-deduction 
discrimination, meaning donors receive different sized deductions depending on to whom 
or what they give. The reason for this issue with taxes is that they are not autonomous. 
Taxes are related to and affect numerous other variables today on top of income, 
including market prices, government spending, inflation, etc., that these factors must be 
taken into consideration when discussing potentially changing tax rates. 
Therefore, although such changes in the budget would be easier and more feasible 
with a quicker response, attempts to influence donors’ expected utility curves may be 
more well-received because of the various issues surrounding budget constraint 
manipulations. DROs should instead focus on decreasing discrepancies between 
perceived risk and actual risk, private benefits and social benefits, as well as decreasing 
discount rates. Seeing this discrepancy as an information asymmetry, each of these 
changes would occur through education. The people need to know more and better 
information about reality. Thus, DROs should try to increase information delivery in 
frequency and amount. They should also make an effort to reduce the delivery costs of 
information for those individuals who view the costs of getting information to be too high 
relative to its benefits. They should try to reach a greater populous with emphasis on 
higher risk areas, and deliver accurate up-to-date information in terms that they people 
with understand. For example, as Kenreuther et al (2004) says, people may know they 
have a one in one-hundred thousand chance of disaster, but do not know how to interpret 
this accurately They see it as a small number, representing very little to no risk, when 




People need to be shown how to better analyze risk – how it varies and how to 
interpret it. In addition, when one’s risk increases, individuals need to know either when 
it happens or be shown how to recognize this. Additionally, education on the external 
benefits of ex ante investment would be another way such organizations could decrease 
the difference between actual total benefits and perceived private benefits. DROs can 
increase awareness for total benefits by educating donors on the externalities of their ex 
ante investment, in showing them that donations would not only benefit themselves 
directly by saving their house or their life, but also their favorite store, or their neighbors 
or friends houses. In this case, the donor’s perceived benefits would move towards 
alignment with the actual benefits they receive.  
 Finally, such organizations can influence discount rates by making the future 
seem more valuable. They can do this by making it seem nearer, as well as more 
influential to other areas in their life. They can also show donors that the returns to their 
investment do not diminish as quick as they think, or that they may not diminish at all. 
Again, each of these would be accomplished through outreach efforts and education.  
 
There may be evidence that even when accurate information is available 
individuals do not necessarily consider it; however, there is also evidence that how the 
information is presented or framed can influence investment decisions (Kenreuther et. al, 
2004). Although there have been some empirical studies on the expected utility model 
(Kenreuther & Pauly, 2006), an empirical study on each of these variables is lacking. In 
addition, empirical studies on the effectiveness of each of the strategies for improvement 




suggest which approaches to take so DROs waste fewer resources targeting ineffective 
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